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Abstract 
An epistemology of engagement 
Within the viewpoint of representationalist epistemology it is 
assumed that objects can be represented in the mind or in 
language by rebuilding images of these objects from 
foundational ideas. In this article I examine the resistance to 
this depiction in an ongoing debate between Rorty and Taylor. 
Taylor argues that we should overcome the disengagement in 
what he sees as representationalism’s dualism of two mutually 
exclusive assumptions. The first assumption is the solipsist 
notion that our ideas can be formed without reference to the 
world outside the mind. According to the second tenet, 
however, it is paradoxically also assumed that these inner ideas 
are representations of the world. Because Rorty mainly targets 
the element of foundationalism in representationalism, he 
seems to argue that all we are able to know are our 
perspectives. I argue (in line with Taylor’s line of thought) that 
                                      
1 Opgedra aan ’n gewaardeerde leermeester. Ek het ’n heelwat vroeëre 
weergawe van hierdie artikel ’n ruk voor sy dood vir “prof. Theo” gegee om sy 
kommentaar te hoor. Hy het een aand spesiaal na my huis gekom en vir meer 
as ’n uur baie intensief ’n aantal belangrike punte met my deurgepraat. ’n Mens 
kan nie anders as om in hierdie optrede, wat homself niks in die sak sou bring 
nie, ’n stuk akademiese integriteit en medemenslikheid raak te sien; ’n houding 
tipies van sy lewe as akademikus. / Dedicated to an esteemed tutor. Some time 
prior to his death I submitted an earlier version of this article to “Prof. Theo” for 
comments and recommendations. In response to this request he made a special 
effort by coming to my home and spending more than an hour in which he 
discussed certain aspects of the article in depth with me. This way of doing that 
would not benefit him in any way reflects an attitude of scholary integrity and a 
sense of humane fellow-feeling typical of his life as academic. 
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this view implies that Rorty leans towards solipsism and thus 
remains under the spell of representationalism. Taylor, on the 
other hand, partially accepts the strong grip of perspectives on 
our knowing but simultaneously devises the concept of “pre-
understanding” to get beyond perspectivism. I argue that 
Taylor’s thinking may still leave us with a mild foundationalism. 
However, the holism he assumes, can be used in a re-formed 
way to bring us a step closer to overcoming the 
representationalist dualism, and to steer us in the direction of 
an epistemology of engagement. 
Opsomming 
’n Epistemologie van verbondenheid 
Binne die raamwerk van die representasionalistiese 
epistemologie word veronderstel dat objekte in denke of in taal 
weergegee kan word deur beelde van hierdie objekte vanuit 
“fondamentele” idees te herbou. In hierdie artikel word die 
weerstand teen hierdie voorstelling ondersoek in die 
voortgaande debat tussen Rorty en Taylor. Taylor betoog dat 
ons nie-gebondenheid moet oorkom in wat hy beskou as die 
representasionalisme se dualisme van twee wedersyds 
uitsluitende veronderstellings. Die eerste veronderstelling is die 
solipsistiese idee dat ons idees gevorm kan word sonder enige 
verwysing na die wêreld buite die denke. Maar, volgens die 
tweede veronderstelling, kan ook paradoksaal veronderstel 
word dat hierdie innerlike idees representasies is van die 
wêreld. Omdat Rorty se teiken hoofsaaklik die element van 
“fondamentalisme” in representasionalisme is, lyk dit of hy 
betoog dat al wat ons in staat is om te ken ons perspektiewe is. 
Ek beredeneer (in ooreenstemming met die denklyn van Taylor) 
dat hierdie sienswyse impliseer dat Rorty neig na ’n solipsisme 
en dat hy dus steeds onder die invloed van die 
representasionalisme verkeer. Taylor, aan die ander kant, 
erken gedeeltelik die greep wat perspektiewe op ons kenne het, 
maar ontwikkel terselfdertyd die konsep “voorverstaan” om 
perspektiwisme te ontkom. Ek beredeneer die stelling dat 
Taylor se denkwyse ons steeds met ’n matige fondamentalisme 
laat. Die holisme wat hy veronderstel, kan egter op ’n her-
vormde manier gebruik word om ons ’n tree nader te bring aan 
die oorkom van ’n representasionalistiese dualisme en kan ons 
dus in die rigting van ’n epistemologie van verbondenheid stuur. 
1. Introduction 
The epistemological tradition associated with modernism attempted 
to distinguish between true knowledge and appearance, a distinction 
that this tradition linked to a dualism between knower and knowable. 
74   Koers 71(1) 2006:73-99 
 Michael Heyns 
The way to overcome this dualism, modernists argued, is to attain 
exact representations of the knowable in the mind or language of the 
knower – hence the label representationalism for this tradition. The 
way to create these true representations lies in the ability of our 
mind or language to gather foundational precepts or ideas about 
things and then to build a representation from these building blocks. 
In the twentieth century, however, massive resistance against this 
view became evident because it failed and in fact increased rampant 
scepticism and agnosticism about the possibility of true knowledge. 
The direction this critique should take became a major issue of 
debate between Richard Rorty and Charles Taylor. The nature of an 
alternative to representationalism will also be the central question of 
this article. My suggested answer will entail that a portrayal of 
reliable knowing will include an inescapable engagement between 
knower and knowable. It will be argued that an over-emphasis of a 
process of representation, which is built on self-created foundational 
concepts, will end in a dualism between knower and known. 
Representation can nevertheless be part of the process of knowing. 
In fact, an epistemology of engagement will consist of many ways of 
knowing a multi-dimensional knowable, which means that this 
epistemology comprises a “thick” process of knowing. 
I will argue that Rorty’s thinking about the possibility of knowing is 
characterised by a strong perspectivism. It is of course crucial for 
the recognition of a Christian viewpoint in for instance science, that 
the idea of one’s perspective as an important influence on knowing 
be recognised. However, I will argue that Rorty’s strong 
perspectivism militates against engagement with the knowable and 
steers him in the direction of solipsism. The worldview direction I will 
take is very well articulated by Wolters (1988:29) when he discusses 
the view of some Christians who argue that the “human powers of 
cognition have been so corrupted by sin as to make them unable to 
discern God’s will for such areas as art, economics, or politics”. 
Against this pessimism Wolters argues that these views “either fail 
to do justice to the constancy of God’s will for creation (or to its 
revelatory power) or else they downplay the renewing power of 
Jesus Christ in restoring our faculty of discernment”. 
Despite a residue of foundationalism in his thinking, Taylor’s 
moderate realism, his plea for a self of engagement, as well as his 
holism opens the door to a view of knowing that favours 
engagement. Although the major drift of Rorty’s perspectivism is 
against engagement, his view of a multi-relational and multi-
Koers 71(1) 2006:73-99  75 
An epistemology of engagement  
functional knowable nevertheless (and inadvertently) opens up 
possibilities for a knowing process based on engagement. 
As positive contribution towards the development of an 
epistemology of engagement I shall take at the end of each 
subsection the transcendental step of formulating a condition for 
knowing reality that can be inferred from important points in the 
debate between Rorty and Taylor. 
2. The human perspective without solipsism 
The aim of knowledge, according to the viewpoints of 
representationalism, is to give an exact representation of reality in 
the mind or in language, a representation that can then be labelled 
the truth about that reality. However, says Rorty (1999:37-38), “truth” 
cannot be the aim of inquiry. He gives two reasons for this claim: 
• Firstly, such an aim would only be warranted “if there were such a 
thing as ultimate justification – justification before God, or before 
the tribunal of reason”. There can, however, not be such a 
tribunal that “envisages all the alternatives to a given belief”.  
• Furthermore, Rorty believes in a “Darwinian picture of the world”, 
which tells us there is no aim for biological evolution; “the 
species” that evolution has as its aim, do not exist. Similarly 
“truth” as the aim of inquiry also does not exist. The philosophical 
aim to say something about “the nature or limits of human 
knowledge” is therefore also impossible. 
The aim of inquiry, Rorty (1991:96-99) says, is merely to list the 
“more important beliefs which we hold at the current stage of 
inquiry”. For Rorty to ask, “But is there really any such thing?” is an 
“awkward way of putting the question”. The question should rather 
be “Are there other beliefs which we ought to have”, a question 
which can only be answered “by enumerating and recommending 
such other beliefs”. This view represents the core of what I shall 
refer to as Rorty’s perspectivism – although, as I shall point out, 
Rorty tries to be more subtle than this apparently crude version of a 
perspectivism that hovers on the brink of solipsism. 
Taylor, on the other hand, insists that we somehow do get in contact 
with reality and do not forever remain within our perspectives. He 
(Taylor, 1991:268-269) uses the example of the “existential 
proposition”, that “there are no chairs in this room”. In this case, he 
says, there will be “no serious temptation to deny that the no chairs 
claim will be true or false in virtue of the way things are”. And, he 
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adds, similar “things could be said of the claim that there are 
electrons or quarks”.  
Rorty (1995:22-23) argues that this claim is not obvious. He sees 
two ways to interpret “in virtue of the way things are”:  
• The first is to see it as “in virtue of the way our current 
descriptions of things are used and the causal interactions we 
have with those things”.  
• The second is “simply in virtue of the way things are, quite apart 
from how we describe them”. Rorty rejects the latter because he 
cannot see how we can make a distinction between “our 
describing activity, our use of words, and the role of the rest of 
the universe in accounting for the truth of our true beliefs”. In 
other words, we should drop the “attempt to sort our propositions 
by whether they are ‘made’ true by ‘the world’ or by ‘us’”.  
Despite Rorty’s attempt to uphold both our “descriptions of things” 
and the “causal interactions” we have with reality, one gets the 
impression that he ultimately chooses to concern himself with only 
the perspective side of knowing (i.e. description). 
It is nevertheless important to take note of the two sides to knowing 
(perspective and interaction with reality) that Rorty points us to. His 
emphasis on perspectives confronts us with the inescapable 
necessity also to take the perspective side always into account. 
Dreyfus (2004:71-72) emphasises this point with the observation 
that the number of chairs in the room depends on the interests of the 
person counting them. If someone for instance wants to seat an 
audience right at a given moment, he should not count the broken 
chairs. This still means that truth is the “correspondence between 
our description of the facts relative to our interests and the facts 
themselves”. 
That our interests and thus perspective play an important role in our 
knowing is a claim that Taylor will readily agree with as we shall see. 
However, Rorty, mostly seems to have in mind that perspective is 
the only thing that plays a role. He (Rorty, 1999:48-50) assumes for 
instance that “everything2 is a social construction” and that “all 
awareness is a linguistic affair”, which means our linguistic 
descriptions “will always be a function of our social needs”. The 
                                      
2 The italics in this paragraph are mine – M.H. 
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latter view implies that there cannot be a distinction between 
knowing things and using them. The only possible distinction is 
between a “less useful” and a “more useful” description of the world. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on articulation implies, Rorty (1999:50) 
says, that “we shall never be able to step outside of language, never 
be able to grasp reality unmediated by a linguistic description”. 
These reductionist pronouncements give Rorty the image of a 
solipsist exponent of postmodern3 perspectivism. Moreover, while 
denying individual solipsism, Rorty (1991:101) insists in typical 
postmodern fashion that “the community of inquirers” to which a 
knower belongs, gives her most of her beliefs. This community 
however “is stuck, for the time being, within its own vocabulary”. 
This view means, Rorty (1999:xxv) says, that we cannot see truth as 
the goal of inquiry. The goal of inquiry is rather “to achieve 
agreement among human beings about what to do to bring about 
consensus on the ends to be achieved and the means to be used to 
achieve those ends”. The individual self of modernism who lives in 
the shadow of solipsism, seems to be merely substituted by a 
postmodern collective self that remains in the same shadow.4
This picture can leave one with the impression that justification is 
merely a matter of giving reasons to satisfy our peers. This view of 
justification makes justification nothing more than a social practice 
with only the authority of the society that does the justification. The 
critic will ask in this case, says Gutting (2003:47): “How can genuine 
knowledge be based simply on what seems right to some particular 
group?”. Gutting (2003:49-52) advises Rorty to take into account 
that consensus is usually the outcome of a complicated process of 
“successful reason-giving”, which includes a thorough investigation 
and critique of the evidence. Instead Rorty seems to opt for a purely 
“decisionist (or voluntarist) view of knowledge”. However, if Rorty 
also accepts “careful argumentation” as condition, his view that 
there is no other way for us to justify beliefs than the social practice 
of giving reasons, will still be regarded by Gutting as a “coherent and 
plausible alternative to what representationalism has to offer”. What 
Gutting proposes in this respect remains, however, within the 
                                      
3 Braeckmans (1997:167-169) describes postmodern epistemology as an 
intertextuality that becomes a hyperreality, which suggests that reality cannot 
touch us, or does not even exist. 
4 Hollis (1991:247-249) in fact argues that eventually in Rorty the “‘I’ of cogito is 
being replaced with a ‘we’ of conversation”. 
78   Koers 71(1) 2006:73-99 
 Michael Heyns 
bounds of proceduralism,5 which still do not assume an inescapable 
engagement with reality. 
Taylor is therefore justified to have “the dark suspicion” that Rorty is 
still being “in the thrall” of modernist representationalism when he 
tells us that “we all only know the world mediately, through a screen 
of representations which each of us forms in the mind”. This means 
that “stubborn differences in representation would be unarbitrable, 
because no one would ever be able to get behind our pictures into 
contact with the world out there”.(Taylor, 1991:260). Representation-
alism always produces the suspicion that maybe the world does not 
really conform to the representation (Taylor, 2003:162). Thus, when 
the representationalist picture of how we establish truth fails, all that 
is left is the self-enclosed subject, “out of contact with the 
transcendent world”. From this solipsism it is a small step to anti-
realism. If we can never know whether our ideas or language 
correspond to the extra-knower reality, then how can we speak of 
the existence of this reality in the first place? In the end it seems as 
if representationalists and Rorty find themselves in the same 
“dialectical universe”. Both will try to answer the fear that our 
representations are only in our heads (Taylor, 2003:168). 
A first condition for an epistemology of engagement: We need 
to accept the idea that all knowledge is a perspective determined by 
our interests, aims and beliefs. However, if we take Taylor’s critique 
of Rorty seriously, perspective should not condemn us to the 
assumption of solipsism that the idea of engagement between 
knower and the knowable is an equally important dimension of 
knowing. 
3. Reality without the un-engageable 
Taylor (2003:174-175) maintains that although far-reaching 
differences sometimes exist in our perspectives, agreement on 
representations can be “within the context of a basic engagement 
with/understanding of the world”. It is because we have contact with 
a “common world” that we are able to speak to one another and 
have “something to point to in disputes about reality”. 
                                      
5 See subsection 5 dealing with “Representation/perspective without the 
disengaged self" for a description of proceduralism. 
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A good example of this common contact with reality is Taylor’s  
concept import as something in a situation that one is able to deal 
emotionally with. Taylor (1985a:47-51) acknowledges that an 
emotion is not simply an objective description of the situation. It is, 
on the other hand, also not true that emotion is based on pure 
perspective. There is rather a “sense” of a situation as having a 
certain property about which we cannot be neutral. We experience a 
situation as “bearing a certain import”. An import is the “way in which 
something can be relevant or of importance to the desires or 
purposes or aspirations or feelings of a subject”. It brings something 
subject-independent to the subjective interests of humans. He 
therefore says that “to ascribe an import is to make a judgement 
about the way things are, which cannot simply be reduced to the 
way we feel about them”.6
The claim that there is something perspective-independent in the 
knowable may seem like the representationalist attempt to know 
something that severely resists knowing and thus can be a token of 
the dualism between knower and knowable. Rorty (1995:23) indeed 
accuses Taylor of still believing in “Kant’s notion of ‘things-in-
themselves’”. Taylor, he says, assumes for his theory of 
correspondence that we posit something like “the world as it is in 
itself” or “the features which a thing has intrinsically, independent of 
how we describe it”.7  
The weakness Rorty primarily attacks in representationalism is the 
latter’s foundationalism. According to Rorty we have no perspective-
free precepts from which to build our representations. This point of 
attack is probably closely connected to an anti-essentialism. This is, 
according to Rorty (1999:50), the attempt to know an object with the 
aim to be “related to something intrinsic” to that object. But, he says, 
there is no “inner core of X and a peripheral area of X”. There can 
thus be no such thing as a “description which matches the way X 
really is, apart from its relation to human needs or consciousness or 
language”. Rorty (1999:58) primarily targets the essentialist claim 
that objects have “non-relational, intrinsic, essences which may, 
alas, be beyond our ken”. Rorty (1999:58) therefore remarks that the 
“Kantian lament that we are for ever trapped behind the veil of 
subjectivity is merely the pointless, because tautologous, claim that 
                                      
6 Cf. similar descriptions by Taylor (1985a:101, 197-198; 1985b:55). 
7 Cf. a similar evaluation by Rorty (1980:41). 
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something we define as being beyond our knowledge is, alas, 
beyond our knowledge”.  
Taylor (1980:47-48; 1995:215) complains that Rorty rather targets 
the “Kantian distinction between things-in-themselves and the 
phenomenal” than his (Taylor’s) view.8 Kant distinguished “things as 
they are outside of any relation to human knowledge (in-themselves) 
from things as they are in relation to human knowledge (for us)”. 
Taylor emphasises that by “the very definition, we can never achieve 
knowledge of such a world-in-itself” (Taylor, 1980a:47-48).9 Taylor 
insists that “Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself is very much a 
creation of the epistemological tradition”. It was created by the 
“belief that what we are immediately aware of is appearances or 
representations”. In distinction, we see the thing-in-itself “as 
something which we can by definition have no experience of”. 
However, if we can disregard the influence of this general 
presupposition, the idea of the “thing-in-itself makes no further 
sense”. Taylor therefore expresses his “puzzlement” that “talk of 
thought corresponding to reality, even to a reality independent of my 
representations, should be linked to the invocation of a thing-in-
itself” (Taylor 1991:270-271). 
The point Taylor suggests seems important. This point entails that a 
perspective that claims to be in contact with reality does not need to 
assume an essentialist ontology in which essences are understood 
to be substances that are in principle unrelated and unknowable but 
nevertheless underlie everything that exists. Moreover, such an 
essence (essentialism) usually comprises a reduction of the totality 
of reality to a single aspect thereof. This aspect is then seen as the 
core that underlies everything that exists. The alternative is thus to 
look at reality through the lens of a multi-aspectuality. (I shall return 
to this theme.) 
A second condition for knowing as engagement: If we want to 
avoid the looming solipsism (and reductionism) of represent-
ationalism and perspectivism we need to see reality through a non-
essentialist lens which means that the aim of knowing is to engage 
                                      
8 Cf. the same complaint against Rorty’s interpretation of Taylor’s position by 
Taylor (1985:219). 
9 It is questionable if Rorty and Taylor are really fair to Kant for, as one of the 
referees of this article remarked: "Kant het egter besef dat daar ’n denkvorm 
moet bestaan waarin die (ondenkbare) ‘Ding-op-sigself’ gedink kan word – en 
dit is vir Kant die rede-ideë (grensbegrippe)." 
Koers 71(1) 2006:73-99  81 
An epistemology of engagement  
with the multitude of aspects of reality that are knowable and are 
thus engageable. 
4. Representation/perspective without dualism 
Taylor (1989b:474) claims that the fundamental notion of 
representationalism is “an ultimately incoherent amalgam” of two 
tenets.  
• The first tenet is that of solipsism: ideas are “self-enclosed, in the 
sense that they can be accurately identified and described in 
abstraction from the ‘outside’ world”.  
• The second tenet is that of representation: our ideas 
“nevertheless point toward and represent things in that outside 
world”.  
Taylor, however, points out that it is important to note that these two 
tenets exclude each other. This exclusion or non-contact, one can 
add, is the main feature of the dualism inherent to 
representationalism. 
Rorty’s (1991:100) solipsism and thus imminent anti-realism mean 
that he is “tempted to say that there were no objects before 
language shaped the raw material (a lot of ding-ansichy, all-content-
no-scheme, stuff)”. He wants to discard even the “ding-ansichy” stuff 
and to create a “hall-of-mirrors effect – in getting us to stop asking 
which is the real thing and which is the image, and to settle for an 
ever-expanding choice of images”. Rorty, in other words, seems to 
solve the representationalist dualism by getting rid of only the 
representation tenet and settling for a monistic solipsism. 
Taylor, on the other hand, suggests that there is a place for 
representation because engagement with reality is possible. He 
(Taylor, 1995:220) uses the example10 of the difference between 
Aristotle’s view that the sun is a planet and our understanding that 
the sun is not a planet, to illustrate alternative ways of describing the 
same reality. These alternative descriptions, he says, can be ranked 
according to the way they “permit us to grasp, or prevent us from 
grasping features of reality”. This ranking is not “untrivial” because 
                                      
10 Cf. Taylor (2003:173-174) for a similar example and description. 
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the better one gives us a better “handle” on “how things work in our 
galaxy”.11
Rorty regards representation as “trivial”. He (1995:26-27) is aware of 
the rebuttal of realists who will argue that “although the descriptions 
may vary depending on the describer, the thing described does not”. 
Therefore, so goes the realist argument, we shall have to make 
room “for the traditional dualisms” because we should have “a clue 
to what is real rather than apparent”. Rorty answers that he will 
simply “evade this question” and not fall in his “opponents’ trap by 
taking seriously problems which owe their existence to the 
scheme/content distinction”. He will rather shift “the burden of 
argument” to his opponents by asking them to indicate the “way of 
getting between language and its object … in order to suggest some 
way of telling which joints are nature’s … and which merely ‘ours’”. If 
they cannot give an indication, he cannot see any point in the claim 
that some descriptions correspond to reality better than others. 
In a recent round in their ongoing debate Taylor (2003:158-159) 
remarks that Rorty is a “minimalist” who wants to simply walk away 
from the representationalist picture while Taylor himself is a 
“maximalist” who thinks it is not possible to only walk away from it 
all. If you do not identify, work through the issues, and see where 
they went wrong, you will remain the captive of the 
representationalist picture. 
This ongoing captivity seems true when Rorty (1991:100-101) 
senses that there is “something dubious” about the idea that there is 
nothing else to do but to “rearrange our mental representations into 
pleasing or useful patterns”; that the knowing process is only a 
search for a “coherent set of beliefs”. He knows that he will be 
accused of solipsism; that if he gives up “the notion of representing 
objects” he never gets “outside his own head”. He accepts that what 
he has been saying “amounts to accepting this gambit” but he 
emphasises that this is “all anybody can do”. He nevertheless tries 
to say that his solipsism is not as bad as it sounds because one of 
his “more central, difficult-to-imagine-revising beliefs” is that objects 
                                      
11 Taylor (1989a:58, 72) formulates the same idea with regard to moral principles 
in what he calls the BA (best-account) principle. This principle implies that we 
make sense of life in terms of certain concepts “unless and until we can replace 
them with more clairvoyant substitutes”. The aim of this principle is to show “not 
that some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some position is superior 
to some other”. 
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he does not control are continually causing him to have new and 
surprising beliefs. He therefore claims that his anti-idealistic 
sentiment means he “believes, as strongly as does any realist, that 
there are objects which are causally independent of human beliefs 
and desires”. He nevertheless adds that an acknowledgement of 
independent objects “is all that is required to satisfy our realistic 
intuitions”. An extra-interpretation reality is not that important 
because we “are not also required to say that our descriptions 
represent objects”. Representation is simply “a fifth wheel”. 
This low-key realism creates the suspicion that Rorty still thinks of 
perspectives as pointing to something outside the perspective 
although he believes that contact with this outer world is not 
important or even possible.12 Rorty’s perspectivism, like represent-
ationalism, creates the dualist image of two independent and 
irreconcilable entities; a reality out there does exist but the only 
things we are able to know are our perspectives. His emphasis on 
the solipsist side furthermore implies that Rorty’s dualism is 
hierarchical; solipsism gets the higher position. This is of course the 
opposite of representationalism’s dualism which gives the element 
of representation the higher position but nevertheless is haunted by 
the possibility of pure solipsism. 
A third condition for an epistemology of engagement should 
thus read as follows: If we want to avoid the looming solipsism of 
representationalism and perspectivism, we need to find a way that 
bypasses the dualism (non-contact) between representations/ 
perspectives and the things about which we have these 
representations/perspectives. We need, in other words, a view in 
which representations and perspectives fundamentally or in principle 
are in contact with reality. 
5. Representation/perspective without the disengaged 
self 
The motivation behind Rorty’s resistance to representationalism 
seems to be a monistic perspectivism which comprises anti-realism 
and solipsism. These two components of his monism interact with a 
third, that is the idea of a self-creative human being that needs to 
distance itself from any determining extra-self realities. 
                                      
12 Holówka (1991:190-191) and Gutting (2003:55) also criticise this ambiguity, 
inconsistency or dualism in Rorty’s reasoning. 
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True to his anti-essentialism Rorty (1999:52) emphasises that 
humans have no intrinsic nature, there is no unchangeable human 
essence that makes humans different from the rest of the universe. 
He thinks that being human merely indicates an “open-ended 
notion”; “a fuzzy but promising project rather than an essence”. 
However, despite this rejection of any inherent nature, Rorty 
assumes two crucial abilities for humans. 
Rorty’s perspectivism depends for a large part on the fact that he 
(1999:64-65) is “happy to admit that human beings are unique in a 
certain respect: that … human beings are able to use language, and 
so are able to describe things”. Rorty tries to keep this emphasis 
within the bounds of his anti-essentialism by connecting our 
linguistic abilities with Darwin’s historicism. Our capacity to use 
language, he says, simply means that we acquired “more of the sort 
of cunning which the lower anthropoids had already manifested”. He 
also argues that language does not have an intrinsic nature. He 
insists that it is only a tool for coping with objects (i.e. not a tool for 
representation or with which one gets “closer to the intrinsic nature” 
of something). 
Nevertheless, although Rorty tries not to elevate language to the 
status of human essence, he at least regards language as a crucial 
human ability. Our relative greater success than that of other 
animals is because of this ability. 
There is, however, a second related ability of which one gets the 
impresssion that it moves even closer to the taboo of human 
essence in his thinking. He promotes a creative (through the 
language ability) rather than a knowing self. 
Rorty (1999:34) urges us to stop worrying about the well-
groundedness of beliefs and start being concerned about 
imaginative alternatives to these beliefs. This, he says, is to 
substitute a search for “the eternal” with a project of “self-creation on 
a communal scale”. In reaction to Taylor, Rorty (1995:20) says that 
“one of the most important changes for the better in recent centuries 
is our increasing willingness to see our poets as edifying examples 
of how to be mere human self-fashioners, rather than as people who 
open us up to something other than themselves, and perhaps other 
than human”. He therefore questions Taylor’s “conviction that ‘the 
poet’ … is pointing to something – God, the tradition”. Rorty believes 
we should “swing free of any such universalistic belief”.  
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This self-creative view of the human being is, however, not entirely 
new. According to Taylor (1989b:465-472) it started with Descartes’ 
introduction of the idea that certainty is generated by the mind and 
not given by the cosmic order. The mind therefore “requires a 
reflexive turn”; it has to investigate carefully the reliability of its own 
functioning. This requirement has the consequence “that our thought 
about the real can be distinguished from its objects and examined 
on its own”. The latter disconnection produced a dualism not only 
between knower and known but also between the self and its 
environment. The belief that flows from this view is that which Taylor 
calls the disengaged self, which appears in representationalism in 
the guise of the solipsist self. This is the subject that is free and 
rational to the extent that it has fully distinguished itself from its 
natural and social embeddings. This view has originally appeared in 
classical dualism implying that the subject withdraws even from its 
own body in order to look on it as object. 
Taylor is fundamentally sceptical about this view of the self’s relation 
to reality. Descartes, Taylor (1989a:156-160,167-168, 97-198) says, 
argued that we should not be seen as attuned to the cosmic order or 
God, but rather that our lives are shaped by the orders that we 
solipsistically construct according to the demands of reason. This 
view presupposes that rationality is not defined primarily sub-
stantively, but rather procedurally. This view requires a turn to the 
inner self where certainty is generated “by following the right 
method”. The motive for this move has a lot to do with control and 
an emphasis on what Taylor calls the “poetic” powers of the self. In 
fact, the fascination with our poetic capacities “rises at times almost 
to obsession in our century”. What one finds in this respect is the 
growing ideal of a human agent who is able to remake himself and 
his world by methodical action. This ideal started with the idea that 
knowledge comes not from connecting the mind to the order of 
things, but representing reality according to the right procedures. 
This approach, however, regards our knowledge of things as our 
own construct. It was literally thought that our world picture is the 
putting together of building blocks that consist of the sensations or 
ideas produced by experience. 
Disengagement from an order of things can thus be seen as a 
serious problem within the representationalist view because it tries 
to escape our fundamental embeddedness in the world. This 
problem is, however, equally true of Rorty’s perspectivism which 
also assumes a self-creativist self. Rorty tries to escape this 
accusation. He (1999:xxi-xix, xxii) simply wants to walk away from 
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the distinction between the “found and the made” because this 
concept has been created by Greek-Christian tradition with a certain 
utility in mind. Today we do not have these goals in mind. The most 
important question is therefore to ask what the utility of a particular 
vocabulary entails. Rorty cannot see any use for the find-create 
distinction, and therefore hopes to replace it with a distinction 
between “the more useful and the less useful”. This emphasis on 
utility as alternative for the find-create dualism is, however, in 
conflict with the emphasis he attached to self-creation as mentioned 
earlier. His solution thus appears to be a monism in which one side 
of the dualism (“the found”) is simply discarded. 
From this critique on a monism in which one aspect is discarded 
follows at least two important conditions for an engaged process of 
knowing. 
• Knowing reality is important 
The first links with Gutting’s (2003:57-58) view that Taylor’s 
substantive approach implies that we are inescapably in contact with 
the world outside us and even know specific things about it. Gutting 
calls these “specific things” “baseline, humdrum truths”. Although 
these truths can and should be criticised we “always start inquiry 
and reflection” from them. Moreover, he says, if we accept this 
approach, we will be able to avoid many of Rorty’s dubious 
formulations like his avoidance of knowing truths about the world 
and his attempt to replace it with group consensus. This approach 
leaves him weak before the charge of “incoherent relativism and 
scepticism”. The latter will “dissolve once we accept humdrum 
realism”. 
For Van Woudenberg (1996:79-80) this substantive approach puts 
ontology before epistemology, and our “everyday” experience before 
theoretical knowledge. I would rather see an equality and interaction 
between ontology and epistemology because the two disciplines 
usually influence and enhance each other – and this is most 
probably also true of the relation between “everyday” knowledge and 
theory. (I will elaborate on these relations of interaction, where one 
discipline or kind of knowledge cannot be foundational for the other, 
in the next section.) 
Nevertheless, an important fourth condition for the process of 
knowing is that knowledge cannot proceed from represent-
ationalism’s or perspectivism’s purely self-creativist self, for such a 
self denies our fundamental embeddedness in reality and thus 
Koers 71(1) 2006:73-99  87 
An epistemology of engagement  
makes the idea of knowing obsolete. Positively stated: Knowing or 
finding the truth about reality is important because we are 
embedded in a reality that crucially influences our functioning in it. 
• The structures of reality enables and necessitates knowing 
The idea of an inescapable engagement with reality as well as his 
mentioning of a cosmic order brings us to a second implication of 
Taylor’s notion of engagement. Dreyfus (2004:67-77) argues that 
“Taylor’s novel approach” includes that we get “in sync with the 
structure of the universe the better to cope with it”. 
Dreyfus refers to Taylor’s (2003:170-171) example of telling Johnny 
to go into a room to see if the picture in it is crooked. Johnny does 
not verify the belief that the picture is crooked with his own belief 
about the picture. What is at stake in Johnny’s knowing is “causal 
contact with the world” as well as “certain procedures and standards 
of justification”. With the latter Taylor has in mind Johnny’s ability to 
deal with things. Johnny knows for instance what is the correct 
distance and orientation to stand in front of the picture. 
The latter is a strong suggestion of a structure for the world and our 
knowing abilities. Thus, although Taylor does not go as far as to 
positively state that reality has a structure, it is not far-fetched to also 
see in Taylor’s account the assumption of causal structures in the 
universe that influences our knowledge of the universe. This 
assumption is for instance also strongly suggested in the idea of an 
“import”13 that is part of the knowable about which we cannot be 
neutral. The importance of a structure for reality, Dreyfus (2004:77) 
remarks, is that “the universe solicits us to get a better and better 
grip on its causal structure, and rewards us with more and more 
successful coping”. 
A fifth condition for an epistemology of engagement can thus be 
formulated as follows: The fundamental embeddedness of the self in 
her world assumes a structure for human abilities and reality that 
enables and necessitates engagement (knowing). 
6. “Living with things” 
Taylor’s argument for engagement with an extra-self reality does not 
assume a grasp of reality in an absolute sense. He even introduces 
                                      
13 Discussed in section 3 on “Reality without the unknowable". 
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a somewhat perspectivist outlook. Taylor (1985b:17-21) says for 
instance that if someone does not agree with your interpretation, you 
have to show him/her by means of other expressions why your 
interpretation should be preferred. This view is a circle in the sense 
that what we appeal to as our grounds for a particular interpretation 
can only be other interpretations. Sometimes the “scientific” demand 
seems to be that we reach “a level of certainty which can only be 
attained by breaking beyond the circle”. However, argues Taylor, for 
his approach the concept break-out is not well-chosen; his idea is 
rather that understanding must bring an issue to “an inner clarity 
which is absolute”. This is to clear up a meaning that was originally 
confused, fragmentary and cloudy. Taylor thus sees a “successful 
interpretation” as one that provides interpretations until you convince 
the other party. 
Despite this seemingly perspectivist portrayal of knowing Taylor 
maintains a moderate realist position; he tries to give a place to both 
interpretation/perspective and connection to reality. All of this may 
seem like a dialectical jumping between interpretation and 
connection, and thus like a dualism that lingers in his thinking. 
Others also sense this ambiguity. Dreyfus (2004:63-65) remarks that 
it may seem that Taylor does not really deviate from Rorty who 
largely ignores independent realities with the argument that it is 
more useful to be busy with ideas and beliefs. Brown (1989:112) 
indeed thinks that Taylor is still the captive of a solipsist 
epistemology. It is nevertheless clear that some degree of 
connection with and even representation of reality outside 
perspective is possible in Taylor’s thinking, and regarded as 
important despite the influence of the perspectivist paradigm in the 
current intellectual climate. How is this dual claim (perspective as 
well as connection with reality) to be justified without falling back on 
the dualism of representationalism? 
According to Dreyfus (2004:66) Taylor’s “original move” that 
diverges from Rorty’s position is the claim that we cope and are in 
touch with reality in a way that is more basic than meaning-giving. 
This basic involvement is actually the engagement on which 
significance depends. 
Taylor uses the Heideggerian concept of pre-understanding to 
express this idea. Pre-understanding, he says, is knowledge we 
have before any formulation of how we deal with things (Taylor, 
1980b:28). Language does not play a direct role in pre-
understanding. Taylor gives the example of feeling uncomfortable in 
some conversation. When one finally articulates that one feels 
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uncomfortable because of jealousy one has the sense that it was not 
as if there was total ignorance of this emotion before articulation. 
The inarticulate knowledge “has a kind of intermediate status 
between known and quite unknown”. Through language humans 
have the capacity to focus on things and identify an object as 
something that “bears a description X”. But usually we live in the 
world and deal with it without this focusing and conceptualisation 
(Taylor, 2003:163-164).  
A second feature of pre-understanding is that it makes sense of our 
focused conceptualisations because it provides a “background 
sense of reality” (Taylor, 1993:325-326). Our formulations (scientific 
or otherwise) can never exhaustively express our pre-
understanding. The relation is rather the other way round; pre-
understanding is that in virtue of which we know that our 
formulations are true or false. We also need to keep in mind that any 
attempt to articulate this background fully will be futile because 
articulation itself would rely on a background or horizon of “non-
explicit engagement with the world”. In other words, we “cannot turn 
the background from which we think into an object for us” (Taylor, 
1989b:476-477).14
Taylor (2003:162) insists that this version of pre-understanding is 
not a “mediational” grasp of the world. The mediational grasp is the 
idea that all knowledge “comes through something ‘inner’, within 
ourselves or produced by the mind”. In the later more sophisticated 
linguistic turn the inner producer is our language ability that portrays 
representations no longer as ideas but as sentences. Important in all 
these versions is an “Inside/Outside” (or “I/O”) notion which relies on 
the understanding that our “grasp of the world” is something that is 
“in principle separable from what it is a grasp of”. 
Taylor invokes the Heideggerian notion of “being-in-the-world”15 to 
rebut the idea that we “can draw a neat line between my picture of 
an object and that object”. A neat line between my “dealing” and the 
“object” may seem possible when one has beliefs about a football in 
the absence of the ball. However, when it comes to playing football, 
it cannot be done without the ball (Taylor, 1989b:476-477). Another 
                                      
14 Cf. Taylor (1993:328-329; 1991:270) for other apressions of these notions. 
15 Taylor (1993:318) argues that for Heidegger the ideas of “being-in-the-world” 
and “engagement” imply that “the word of the agent is shaped by his or her form 
of life, or history, or bodily existence”. 
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example is the ability to move round in the city. In this case one 
cannot say that knowledge exists in my body apart from my actually 
moving in the city. The locus of the ability to move round is in my 
“body-walking-the-streets”, and not some potentially disengaged 
body part (Taylor, 2003:163). These examples say that our “grasp of 
things is not something that is in us, over against the world; it lies in 
the way we are in contact with the world” (Taylor, 2003:167).  
For Taylor (1989b:477), therefore, our understanding of the world is 
not based on representations, that is, “depictions that are separately 
identifiable from what they are of” (Taylor, 1989b:477), but in a 
“living with things” (Taylor, 2003:163). Important to note is that he 
(Taylor, 1989:476) thinks that even the “condition of our forming 
disengaged representations of reality is that we be already engaged 
in coping with our world, dealing with the things in it”. In other words, 
even in our disinterested, theoretical stance towards the world “we 
have to come to grips with it” which assumes “we are engaged as 
agents coping with things”. Taylor’s exposition of his anti-
representationalism with the concepts pre-understanding and “living 
with things” should thus not leave the impression that it excludes 
representations. 
Nevertheless, a sixth condition for knowledge (including our 
representations) should assume that knowledge is not something 
that can be created by the knowing abilities of the knower 
independently from the knowable. Knowledge comes into being in 
the act of engagement between knower and known. 
7. Engagement without foundationalism 
Taylor’s view that pre-understanding precedes our focus and 
articulation of things, however, needs careful formulation because it 
can be susceptible to foundationalism. 
Rorty (1999:34-35, 37) explains that if we see our beliefs as justified, 
it is a “consequence of the holistic character of belief-ascription”. A 
meaningful belief has connections with other meaningful beliefs. If it 
cannot cohere with other beliefs, it will be seen as an unjustified 
belief. There are thus no “foundational” concepts of knowledge like 
the rationalist “natural order of reasons” or the empiricist 
“deliverances of the senses” that can be used in a context-free 
justification of beliefs. It is nevertheless important to note that the 
“whole” that Rorty refers to, is regarded by him as an intra-human 
system of beliefs and sentences that does not necessarily engage 
with a reality outside this web. 
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Taylor (2003:160) shares with Rorty the rejection of foundationalism; 
that is, the project of building a “principled justification of our beliefs 
about the world from the ground up”. This anti-foundationalism also 
implies that claims cannot be verified each on their own. But, Taylor 
says, this is where Rorty’s holism ends because he still seems to 
accept the “Cartesian-empiricist doctrine of the atomism of the 
input”. Taylor (2003:162) seems to imply that according to Rorty 
perceptions and ideas only take a holistic interdependent mode 
once they appear inside the knower’s linguistic representations. This 
leaves the idea in place that an agent’s knowledge is distinct from 
the world. Taylor (2003:160) wants holism to be more radical than 
this by seeing any single element always in a larger whole in which 
its meaning is defined. There is no such thing as the single 
independent perception. Something is a perception only within a 
wider context. 
Rorty, however, appears to agree with Taylor. Rorty (1999:xxii-xxiii) 
too rejects the I/O picture which, in his opinion, means that there is 
no possibility that words “can take one out of touch with reality”. 
Words/statements are tools (like e.g. a hammer) which we use to 
interact with our environment. Representationalism, on the other 
hand, will prompt us to ask the “question of whether human minds 
are in touch with reality” because it wants to represent the “intrinsic 
nature” of our environment. According to Rorty this question cannot 
be asked because there is no way we can have a “Cartesian picture 
of a mind which somehow swings free of the causal forces exerted 
on the body”. This statement of belief in a fundamental engagement 
between humans and their environment is of course one of those 
rare moments when Rorty steps out of the solipsism of his usual 
perspectivism. 
According to Taylor pre-understanding precedes and forms the 
basis for focused knowing and articulations. This may give pre-
understanding the image of the “foundation” of our knowing. It is 
nevertheless important to keep in mind that Taylor assumes a 
“radical” holism in which everything receives its meaning from the 
larger whole.16 In order to be consistent Taylor’s idea of pre-
                                      
16 This is an important point that is also acknowledged by others. Toulmin 
(1992:199-201) for instance argues against the modernist ideal of a rational 
method that could cut away the “inessentials” and identify the “abstract core of 
‘clear and distinct’ concepts”. This ideal, however, will not solve any real-life 
problems, he says. What we need is to re-contextualise (re-engage) what we 
know – especially by putting it in the “larger human frame”. 
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understanding should then also receive meaning from focused 
knowledge; our acts of meaning-giving, representation, articulation 
and focus also inform our pre-understanding. There is no 
foundationalist one-way movement from pre-understanding to 
representation but a mutual moulding of each other. It should 
therefore also be possible to speak of acts of representation as my 
“mind-grasping-this-object”. In this formulation the intention is not to 
shape representations out of perceptions, ideas or pre-
understandings that exist atomistically, independently and which can 
be used as the foundations from which the mind or language is able 
to build a body of knowledge. 
A seventh condition for knowing as engagement: Knowing 
reality proceeds in an anti-foundationalist way. This implies an 
ongoing process of interaction between my abilities to engage with 
reality and the objects of knowing that stimulate my abilities of 
knowing. 
8. Multi-mode knowing and the multi-functional 
knowable 
Rorty’s critique of modernist epistemology is primarily directed to the 
problem of foundationalism and he seems not to be particularly 
concerned about the solipsism and thus disengagement that are 
endemic to representationalism. Taylor’s criticism of represent-
ationalism, however, is primarily directed to this weakness of the 
modernist epistemological enterprise.17 Therefore, although he 
acknowledges and explores the huge influence of human 
perspectives on human knowledge, he also tries to find ways for 
these perspectives to engage with the extra-perspective world. 
Especially important is his argument that contact between the world 
and our perspective is facilitated by our pre-understanding which lies 
midway between knowledge and a non-focused dealing with the 
world. 
The idea of a pre-understanding has two crucial implications.  
• Firstly, the moment one starts to know, as well as during the 
entire knowing process, one deals also with the knowable. The 
                                      
17 Cf. Slors (1995:23-25) for a similar evaluation of the difference between Rorty 
and Taylor. 
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knower is not in a position where she knows only representations, 
perspectives and interpretations.  
• Secondly, a knower’s ability to form a pre-understanding not only 
involves her senses and rational capacity but more abilities of 
grasping reality are needed in order to get the broader 
background of the world in which she wants to know her way. 
This ability is an important intuition because supporters of 
representationalist epistemology tend to recognise only the mind 
and sense experience as knowing abilities.18 
The latter idea of a multi-mode knowing of pre-understanding 
becomes clear in a recent account of Taylor’s idea of pre-
understanding. In his latest exchange with Rorty, Taylor (2003:159, 
161) argues that pre-understanding includes a host of abilities to 
cope with the world. He names our bodily capacity to find our way in 
our physical surroundings, our social intuition on how to relate to 
and interact with others and also the beliefs we hold, “which may or 
may not be ‘in our minds’ at the moment”. He accuses 
“intellectualism” of making us see these abilities as “very different 
sites”. The anti-representationalist tradition, however, “has shown 
how closely akin they are, and how interlinked”. He nevertheless 
insists that these capacities precede representations in the form of 
articulations; that they only inform the inarticulate background that 
allows the representations that we do form. 
Rorty (1995:31-32) acknowledges that Taylor’s idea of pre-
understanding means that he “sees a more primordial relation with 
the world than representation”. He nevertheless accuses Taylor of 
still assuming a divide between this primordial relation with the world 
and language. Rorty, on the other hand, claims that he sees “no 
break between non-linguistic and linguistic interactions of organisms 
(or machines) with the world”. He therefore cannot see “our non-
linguistic causal interaction with the rest of the universe as 
‘grounding’ knowledge” because “formulating and verifying 
propositions” are “just a special case of what Taylor calls ‘dealing’ 
and I call ‘coping’”.  
                                      
18 According to Van Woudenberg (1996:76-77) it is crucial for supporters of the 
epistemological tradition that they claim to be sure about the sources for 
knowledge and then reduce these sources to sense experience, memory, 
consciousness and reason. In other words, conformation to only these sources 
of knowledge is the criterion for true knowledge. 
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At another place Rorty’s (1999:55-57, 59) critique becomes clearer. 
He states that it is especially essentialists who argue that language 
is not our only cognitive access to objects. Essentialists think some 
“prelinguistic knowledge” of things does exist, knowledge that 
cannot be caught in language. The essenstialist, he says, will 
demonstrate this prelinguistic knowledge by banging on the table 
and will cringe to demonstrate that he has acquired a bit of 
knowledge that escapes language. Rorty is not convinced that this 
non-linguistic way of knowing gives a more intimate kind of 
knowledge. He thinks that all you will gain is more statements about 
the table. At this stage you will be able to say that the table is brown, 
ugly, and will cause pain if one bangs on it. One does not get more 
intimate knowledge of the number 17 by working out its square root. 
Similarly one does not get closer to the “intrinsic nature” of a table 
by banging on it. Hitting merely relates the table to a few more 
things. It does not take you “out of language into fact”. 
Once again one gets the impression that Rorty too quickly tries to 
pin essentialism on Taylor and that he allocates an inflated role to 
language and perspective. To see ways of “being aware of 
something” other than articulation does not mean that one tries to 
break through to some essence. Rorty may, nevertheless, be onto 
something that Taylor does not get right if he suggests that linguistic 
representation is not a secondary act that follows only after some 
foundational pre-understandings. Taylor and Rorty’s views should 
be amended to state that it is possible to see articulation as an act of 
knowing on an equal footing and in co-operation with other acts of 
knowing. Rorty should thus rather make more of the idea that, like 
articulation as a specific way of coping with the world, there are also 
others. But then again, Rorty fails to recognise that Taylor’s notion of 
pre-understanding points to kinetic, sensory, reasoning, emotional, 
social sensitivity, as well as meaning-giving ways of experiencing 
the world. 
Rorty concentrates on the idea that there are no linguistically 
unmediated perceptions or ideas that can serve as foundations for 
the creation of representations in the human mind or in language. 
He suggests that knowledge almost always implies merely beliefs, 
interpretations or perspectives that are determined by our goals for 
using these ideas. It is however, doubtful whether  we should go as 
far as Rorty who strongly tends towards enclosure in perspectives 
that rarely care to make contact with the extra-perspective reality. 
An important condition for Rorty’s perspectivism is an anti-realist 
ontology which targets especially the existence of essences. He 
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argues that if essences are in principle not knowable, as it is usually 
presented, it will be nonsensical to try and know and represent it. 
Rorty is of course correct that the problem with representationalism 
is also that it assumes unknowable essences or substances. Rorty’s 
(1999:47) aim to “shake off” metaphysical dualisms like essence and 
accident as well as substance and property, can be supported. In its 
place he proposes a “panrelationalism”, which, he believes, implies 
the meaning that reality consists of “a flux of continually changing 
relations”. The implication of this proposal is that a diversity of 
relations among things can be known. Rorty’s thinking thus 
inadvertently makes room for an extra-perspective reality that can 
be known. Taylor is therefore correct to argue that it is not 
necessary to identify all objects of knowing with unknowable 
essences. 
Rorty’s assumption of the non-durability of relations is, however, 
suspect. He seems to suggest that the “fixed” parts of the dualisms 
he rejects (essence, substance) should be dropped and we should 
invest only in the “fleeting” parts (accident, property) which he 
identifies with relations. This monistic choice for a mere fleeting 
reality would be incoherent even in his own terms. This incoherence 
can be illustrated in his description of the number 17 as example of 
his panrelationism. 
The nice thing about numbers, Rorty (1999:52-53) says, is that it is 
difficult to think of them in terms of essences. The number 17 cannot 
be described except in terms of its relationships to other numbers: it 
is a number less than 22, the sum of 6 and 11, and so on. What 
Rorty hopes to achieve with this example is to convince people that 
there are no essences to be found, and that one can equally not be 
an essentialist about tables, stars, human beings, academic 
disciplines, social institutions or anything else. There is nothing to be 
known about things except a “forever expandable web of relations to 
other objects”. 
Rorty’s pan-relationism is onto something in the sense that he does 
not try to identify one single function or relation to which an object 
can be reduced. However, the impression he creates that this 
plurality and interconnection of relations also mean that there are no 
significant durable structure for things, and that this lack implies that 
knowledge of things are superfluous, is simply not true. That 17 
follows upon the number 16, and that it is the sum of 10 and 7 were 
true two thousand years ago, and it will probably be true for times to 
come. Rorty will argue that the number 17 is recognised as 17 
because of human needs and interests. But, he will say, our needs 
96   Koers 71(1) 2006:73-99 
 Michael Heyns 
can change. Moreover, extra-terrestrials or animals will not have a 
concept of 17 because their needs are different. The implication is 
that 17 is human-dependent; there is no 17 apart from human 
needs.19 To this view, two rejoinders can be put forward. Firstly, we 
can emphasise the relation between 17 and 10 more than the 
relation between 17 and 7 because of our contingent needs and 
desires, whatever they may be. These needs and desires, however, 
do not render the relation between 17 and 7 null and void. The latter 
relation is still there despite our needs, and because the structure of 
relations for numbers remains intact. The argument Taylor will most 
likely put forward is that if we decide to change our description of 17 
and its relations, we will probably do it because we think the new 
description will give us a better grip on reality. This description will, 
however, merely prove the point that the way things are outside our 
system of beliefs (perspective) will be important in our decision. 
Rorty’s pan-relationism is not really an argument to escape a side of 
reality that can be called its relational and functional structure. And it 
is important to know it, for if we do not even know that 17 follows 
upon 16, or that it is the sum of 10 and 7, then we know nothing 
about 17 and we should conclude that it does not exist. 
The strong point of Rorty’s pan-relationism is that he makes room 
for the knowing of a multitude of relations between things. What he 
does not acknowledge is that the structure of these relations are 
important to know because they are able to influence the goals and 
interests of people with things fundamentally. Despite his intention to 
simply walk away from epistemology and rather concentrate on self-
creation, Rorty stumbles over an important side of the process of 
knowing, that is, the multi-functional and multi-relational structure of 
the knowable. 
What Rorty does for the knowable, Taylor does for the knower. In 
his attempt to show that a direct grasp of the knowable is possible 
and fundamental, he seems to be in danger of becoming a 
foundationalist. He nevertheless makes it possible to see the 
importance of a multi-mode knowing structure for knowers.  
                                      
19 Cf. the example Rorty (1999:xxvi) gives of the concept giraffe. We use 
languages that include this word and fit our needs or interests. We therefore 
recognise giraffes because we have a word for it and because we want to hunt 
them. But if one is an ant or space voyager, the latter meaning attached to 
giraffe will not necessarily be their tool of recognition or need, and chances are 
that they will not see giraffes as we see them. 
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In conclusion: Rorty and Taylor arrive at what can be called a “thick” 
process of knowing, which contrasts with the “thinness” of 
representationalism with its emphasis on only representations.  
An eighth condition for knowing as engagement thus states that 
we live in a world in which knowing takes place between a knower 
with multiple abilities to engage with a knowable of which we are 
able to know a variety of functions and relations between these 
functions. 
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